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Abstract: The mobile phone devices industry, whose structure is an oligopolistic technological 
frontier, suffered a structural change in the 2000s, with firms once leaders giving way to emerging 
ones. This study’s hypothesis is that this chance happened due to different innovation strategies 
adopted by the firms. The objective is to analyze innovation strategies’ influence on business 
performance of the industry’s firms in general, with Apple, Nokia and Samsung cases in particular – 
considered representative firms of the industry for the period. The methodology used was the game 
theory, comparatively analyzing two games with Nash-Bayesian equilibrium. The results show that, in 
the face of an aggressive strategy of innovation by products of the first firm (Apple), there is a worse 
outcome for the company that competes by innovations by product (Nokia) than by markets 
(Samsung). It is concluded that companies should pay attention to their innovative strategies to remain 
operative in dynamic markets. 
Key words: Mobile phone devices industry; Nash-Bayesian game; Economy of Innovation. 
 
Resumo: A indústria de dispositivos de telefonia móvel, cuja estrutura é de fronteira tecnológica 
oligopolista, sofreu uma mudança estrutural na década de 2000, com firmas antes líderes perdendo 
espaço para firmas emergentes. A hipótese do trabalho é que as diferentes estratégias de inovação 
adotadas pelas firmas foram responsáveis por essa mudança estrutural. O objetivo do trabalho é 
analisar a influência dos tipos de inovação no desempenho das empresas da indústria em geral, e da 
Apple, Nokia e Samsung em particular, firmas tidas como representativas. Para tanto, utiliza-se como 
metodologia um modelo com base na teoria de jogos, analisando dois casos. Os resultados, sob 
equilíbrio Nash-Bayesiano, evidenciam que, em face a uma estratégia agressiva em inovações via 
produtos por parte da Apple, há um pior resultado para a empresa competidora que decide competir 
com inovações via produtos (caso da Nokia) do que a que compete em inovações via mercados (caso 
da Samsung). 
Palavras-chave: Indústria de dispositivos de telefonia móvel; Jogo Não Cooperativos Nash-
Bayesiano; Economia da Inovação. 
                                                          
1
 Possui graduação em Ciências Econômicas pela Universidade Estadual de Londrina (2010) e mestrado em 
Economia pela Universidade Estadual de Maringá (2013). Atualmente é professor colaborador do Departamento 
de Economia da Universidade Estadual de Londrina e doutorando pelo Programa de Ciências Econômicas da 
Universidade Estadual de Maringá. E-mail: angelorondina@gmail.com 
2
 Professor da Universidade Estadual de Mato Grosso do Sul. E-mail: prof.mateusabrita@gmail.com 
3
 Bolsista de Produtividade em Pesquisa 2. Orientador de Doutorado. Doutorado em Ciências (Economia 
Aplicada) pela Universidade de São Paulo, Brasil (2000). Professor Titular da Universidade Estadual de 
Maringá, Brasil. E-mail: jlparre@uem.br 
72 
                                                                          
https://periodicosonline.uems.br/index.php/GEOF/index                                                                                          
 
 
© 2017 - Universidade Estadual de Mato Grosso do Sul. Todos os direitos reservados. ISSN: 2447-9195. 
Geofronter, Campo Grande, n. 3, v. 1, janeiro a junho de 2017, p. 71-95. 
 
 
Introduction 
The industry of mobile phone devices presents an oligopolistic structure, with 
internationalized capital companies operating in a technological frontier context. Throughout 
the 2000s there have been notable advances in products manufactured by firms of this 
industry. The high-tech cellphones in the 2000s were successively enhanced to better meet the 
communication needs of consumers and incorporating diverse functions than traditional 
communication. 
The cellular phone, which dates back to the 1950s, began to be widely commercialized 
in the 1990s. In that decade, the prominent company was Nokia; according to Martti (2002), 
in 1993 the company was the first to transmit text messages via cell phone through the GSM 
system, and in 1998 achieved the highest worldwide market share when it overtook Motorola. 
Throughout the 2000s, in turn, there were considerable improvements in cellular handsets 
produced, as visible in so-called "generations" of mobile – in 2015, there are already cell 
phones of the 4th generation (4G). The improvements, however, did not occur only on 
existing technologies. It might also be checked the inclusion of various functions to mobile 
phones over the decade – examples are the inclusion of cameras, FM radio, MP3 and video 
players etc.
4
 
In 2007, together with these incremental innovations in the physical device (hardware) 
of the existing cell phones, there is the inclusion of an operating system (software), enabling 
the connection to internet network and its use in a similar way of a personal computer. It is the 
genesis of the devices known as smartphones. In this context, the question of technological 
innovation gains decisive role in the performance of companies in this sector. According to 
Kok and Biemans (2009), the lifetime shortening of products and the high competition for the 
best products introduces in the agenda of the administrations of the companies the need to 
guide their performance through innovations. 
Together with changes in the mobile devices industry products, it is possible to check 
also changes in the industry market structure. Leading companies in the production of mobile 
devices in the early 2000s (Ericsson, Motorola, Nokia) loosed ground to other emerging 
                                                          
4
 Viljamaa (2008), in his presentation on the influence of design in the integration of multimedia devices, 
presents an interesting evolution of this integration of functions in the mobile phone industry. 
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companies (Apple, LG, Samsung) at the end of the period. This new scenario leads even to 
the sale of part of those firms in the late 2000s to companies not operating in the market
5
. 
This study starts from the hypothesis that one of the factors responsible for this 
structural change of the mobile phone devices industry were the innovation strategies carried 
out by firms of this industry, which accounts for their different performances. 
The studies about innovation begin in a more structured way in Schumpeter (1911), 
reveling the process of creative destruction resulting from innovations in capitalist markets. 
Freeman and Soete (2008, p. 25), following the line of Schumpeter in the studies of 
innovation, consider that the Research and Development (R&D) department of firms are the 
main entities responsible for social and economic change, as well as for the changes in the 
capitalist production, in the twentieth century. The authors consider these entities, together 
with the industrial production and marketing, of crucial role to the economies. 
In the face of such a change in the mobile phone devices industry structure and the 
hypothesis about the role of innovation strategies used by the firms to explain it, one comes to 
the guiding question of this study: How can the different innovation strategies implemented 
by the firms of the industry of mobile phone devices explain the structural change in the 
industry? 
To answer this question, the paper has as its main objective to analyze the influence of 
different types of innovation strategies on the business performance of the international 
industry of mobile phone devices in general, and Apple, Nokia and Samsung in particular. 
Thus, it will be used a model based on game theory, since it enables an important tool for 
analyzing the behavior of firms operating in strategic oligopolistic competition. This is the 
case of Apple, Nokia and Samsung, firms that will be taken as representative of the mobile 
phone industry for the 2000s. 
Thus, the section following this introduction presents the performance history of the 
mobile phone device industry, particularly throughout the 2000s, the period considered by the 
study. The third section presents some aspects of game theory that will be used to develop the 
game model for the analyzed industry. The fourth section presents aspects related to the role 
of innovation, considered as a central element in the different strategies of firms from the 
                                                          
5
 This is the case, for example, of the purchase by Google of part of Motorola Company in January 2011; and the 
purchase of Nokia conducted by Microsoft in September 2013. 
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mobile phone device industry within the model. This model is presented in the fifth section. 
Lastly, the conclusions are presented. 
Development of the mobile phone device industry in the 2000s 
The telecommunications industry is characterized as an innovative frontier area. The 
mobile phone market, in particular, is characterized as an oligopoly, with large companies 
from different countries whose capitals are internationalized. Examples of these companies 
are Apple and Motorola (United States), BlackBerry (Canada), Ericsson (Sweden), Nokia 
(Finland), Sony (Japan), LG and Samsung (South Korea) and HTC (Taiwan). 
The origin of the mobile phone (cellular phone) is related to the scientific 
developments of the post-War. In 1947, the development of cellular technology began in the 
Bell Laboratory
6
, USA. In 1956, Ericsson developed the first mobile phone, called MTA 
Ericsson, however, with an approximate weight of 40 kg, which precluded their personal use. 
In 1973, Motorola develops the Motorola DynaTAC 8000X, with an approximate weight of 1 
kg; the first mobile with possible personal use, and as point Brandão et al (2009) with 
operating permission by the US Federal Communications Commission in 1983. 
The mobile market starts then from the decade of 1980 (1979 in Sweden and Japan; 
1983 in the US), and is extended to developing countries from the end of the decade – in the 
case of Brazil, for example, in the begging of 1990, as pointed out by Abreu and Moraes 
(2005). Together with other technologies, mobile telephony was considered one of the 
responsible for the Industrial Revolution generated by Information and Communication 
Technologies in the 1990s – Freeman and Soete (2008). 
Throughout the 1990s, the mobile devices industry gained dimension, as evidenced by 
the evolution of stock prices of the companies belonging to it, shown in Figure 1. In it is 
observed the growth in the stock price of leading producers of mobile phones in 1997. It is 
worth noting the period of the called "Internet Bubble", between 1999 and 2000, with the 
atypical rise in stock prices of companies related to Information Technology. In addition, it is 
possible to verify the development over the early 2000s of Apple, related mainly to the 
manufacture of other products than mobile phones
7
. 
                                                          
6
 Research and Development (R&D) laboratory of AT&T. 
7
 Apple did not produce cell phones at the time, being presented in the period due to later comparisons in the 
smartphone market. 
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Figure 1: Evolution of price of shares of the mobile phone devices companies between 1997 
and 2007 – Index (02/01/1997 = 100) 
 
Source: NASDAQ (2014), NYSE (2014). 
Throughout the 2000s, the mobile device, which was used mainly for the purpose of 
mobile communication between people, adds features that were commercialized as products 
from other different markets. Therefore, there is the inclusion of cameras, FM radio, MP3 
reader etc. In 2007, together with these incremental innovations, there is the inclusion of a 
software along the existing hardware in mobile phones, enabling connection to the internet 
data network and its use in a similar way as a personal computer. Since then, these new 
phones that incorporate these possibilities are known as smartphones. 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of share prices of leading companies in the mobile 
devices industry from 2008, the year that the production of smartphones began. It is 
interesting to verify the fall in the value of shares of companies such as Motorola and Nokia – 
considered two of the leading producers of mobile phones devices in early 2000 – in contrast 
to the growth in value of shares of companies like Apple and Samsung
8
. 
                                                          
8
 It is also worth noting the rupture of Motorola and Apple series. For the former, this is due to the sale of part of 
the company (Motorola Mobility) to Google on January 4, 2011; Motorola prices computed from that date refer 
to the part of Motorola Solutions – part of the company that was not sold. Similar process was also found with 
Nokia in which, like Google, other major software company, Microsoft, bought its division of mobile devices on 
September 3, 2013, with no rupture in the series due of total company sales. 
In the case of Apple, the break in the series due to a stock split process carried out on June 9, 2014. 
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Figure 2: Evolution of the price of shares of the mobile phone devices companies between 
2008 and 2014 – Index (02/01/2008 = 100) 
Source: NASDAQ (2014), NYSE (2014), SWB (2014), KRX (2014). 
This diverse business performance transcends the stock market and also can be 
checked by the analysis of the evolution of the balance sheets of these companies. Figure 3 
lists the evolution of revenues and net profits of three of the previous companies (Apple, 
Nokia and Samsung), considered companies with representative situations of performance in 
the considered industry, for the period between the first quarter of 2000 to the first quarter of 
2015. It can be analyzed the performance differential between the three selected companies, 
with Nokia evidencing a declining in the revenues, while the total revenue of Apple and 
Samsung increased after 2007. With regard to net profits of the companies (withdrawing the 
costs and taxable revenue from the earnings), shown in Figure 4, there is a similar scenario, 
with declining net income in the case of Nokia (presenting loss in periods of 2011), and 
increasing profits for Apple and Samsung. It is worth noting that in the case of the latter, there 
is a significant difference between the performances of both too, with Apple’s net profit 
growth with a more significant development than the one of Samsung. 
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Figure 3: Evolution of Total Revenue of selected companies from the industry of mobile 
phone devices between 2000 and 2014 – Index (1Q / 2007 = 100) 
 
Source: APPLE (2014), NOKIA (2014), SAMSUNG (2014). 
Figure 4: Evolution of net earnings of selected companies from the industry of mobile phone 
devices between 2000 and 2014 – Index (1Q / 2007 = 100) 
 
Source: APPLE (2014), NOKIA (2014), SAMSUNG (2014). 
From the data previously presented, it is clear, therefore, a performance differential 
between companies operating in the mobile phone devices industry. There can be many 
reasons for the difference in the evolution of the companies in the 2000s, especially after 
2007, the year that the production of smartphone devices began. This paper presuppose the 
assumption that a key factor for the differential in the performance of companies in the mobile 
phone devices industry over the period considered was the strategy taken with regard to 
innovation. I.e., the different innovation strategies undertaken by companies and the 
effectiveness of these in an oligopolistic competitive environment explain the difference in 
performance of these over the period analyzed. 
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Thus, to analyze the different strategies undertaken by the considered representative 
firms of the mobile phone devices industry, it was used a game theory model. Thus, in the 
next sections, is sought to be presented the theoretical framework of the Games Theory and 
the Innovation Theory in order to enable further structuring of the model. 
Game theory: a brief summary 
The game theory has gained wide application in applied social sciences from the 
1990s. Collaborated for this fact the delivery of the Nobel Prize in economics in 1994 to John 
C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash and Reinhard Selten, especially for the advance on equilibrium 
analysis in theory of non-cooperative games. The first –  as found for example in Harsanyi 
(2001) – uses game theory to formalize the decision-making process of the agents in different 
contexts, and including the incorporation of subjective probability and strategic actions to 
agents. The second – as seen in Nash (1997) – uses game theory to formalize the behavior of 
companies operating in strategic duopolistic competition. The third consolidated the use of 
game theory for the analysis of dynamic strategic interactions, as seen for example in Selten 
(1975). 
As point Kreps (1992) and Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995, p. 217), game 
theory is divided between the strands of cooperative games between the agents and the non-
cooperative games. While the first’s focus is given on a set of agents, in the second the 
emphasis turns to the optimizer individual – which makes it a very useful tool for 
microeconomic theory. 
The extensive representation of non-cooperative games 
According to Osborne (2006), game theory presents a set of models used to understand 
various situations in which the players (decision maker agents) interact. Mas-Colell, 
Whinston and Greene (1995, p. 219) define a game as a representation of a situation where a 
number of players interact in a set of interrelated strategies. Thus, in order to describe a 
strategy interaction, it is necessary to know four elements: i) The players involved. ii) The 
decision rules – i.e., who moves first, what information the agents have and what are the 
possible actions to be undertaken by the players. iii) The results of the actions of the players. 
iv) The payoffs – i.e. the preferences of the players based on the possible outcomes of the 
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actions taken – in microeconomic theory, it is generally associated with the utilities functions 
or the process of maximization of the profit functions. 
To represent an extensive non-cooperative game, according to Kreps (1992), it is 
necessary to include
9
: 
 
i) A list of the finite number of players;  
I.e., a list of players          , where   is finite. In some cases, the “nature” can 
also act as a player. 
ii) The design of the game tree, with its different nodes (initials, decision and 
terminals); 
The game tree is defined as a set  ( ) of all nodes (initials, decision and terminals) in 
a precedence relationship (→) over  . I.e.,   will precede    (    ) if there is a sequence of 
arrows from   to   . 
iii) The designation of the players in each starting or decision node of the game tree; 
The initial nodes are defined as  *   ( )   +, where      , without predecessors. 
The terminal nodes are defined as   *   ( )   +, where       without successors. The 
decision nodes would be the set    of the nodes, excluding the terminal nodes  . I.e.,     
 , with     and      . 
iv) The list of strategies available to players; 
For each         , i.e., each node existing at the union of the initial and decision 
nodes, there is a set  ( ) of strategies available in the node  . 
v) The informational set; 
The set of nodes of decision   is divided in   informational sets. I.e., there is a 
partition   *          + of  , wherein: (a) to   and    that belong to the informational set 
 ,   and    cannot precede; (b) a single player   is assigned to the informational set  ; and (c) 
the strategies available in the nodes of a same informational set are the same for each player – 
the rules do not vary in the same information set. 
This definition means that may be certain   informational subsets of decision nodes 
where the player chooses the strategy in one of the nodes and does not know in which of the 
                                                          
9
 Similar definition is presented by Mas-Collel, Whinston and Greene (1995, p. 227). 
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nodes it is. In this case, are drawn dotted lines connecting all nodes in a given informational 
set     . In such cases, the information is not perfect between the players. 
vi) The players’ payoffs 
The payoffs are usually posed by the existence of an expected utility function. 
Usually, it is made use of the Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions type
10
,  , wherein 
  *       +       – defined as   ( ) –, meaning that for each player   it is delimited a 
payoff by the   function, defined in the set of the real numbers, inserting it into the specific 
terminal node  . 
vii) The probabilities given by the players’ available strategies 
I.e., there is a distribution of probabilities   over the initial set of nodes , so that for 
every       decision node there is a given probability distribution   on the set of strategies 
available  ( ). 
Mas-Collel. Whinston and Greene (1995, p. 227) formalized the extensive form of a 
game through the collection of these elements. In a similar presentation, it is possible to pose 
a game in the extensive form as: 
    *       ( )  ( )    ( )  ( )  +   (1) 
Possible equilibriums of non-cooperative games 
In non-cooperative games, the strategies can be said to be pure or mixed. In the first 
case, it is not assigned probabilities to the players’ different strategies available. In the second 
one, there is the probability assignment by the players. 
It is also capable to distinguish the kind of game in accordance with the movements of 
the players: simultaneously (static), in which all players move together; or sequential 
(dynamic), in which the players move in sequence. Other way of differentiating the kind of 
the game is according to the way that the information about the rules of the game is presented 
to the players. I.e., the game may present: complete information, where all players are as well 
aware of their movements as the other players; and incomplete information, in which case 
there is information of other players who are unknown to one player of the game. The 
                                                          
10
 The mathematician John von Neumann and the economist Oskar Morgenstern, beyond of releasing the basis 
for modern game theory, contributed to the mathematical structuring of the concept that each individual chooses 
an alternative according to a probability, so as to maximize its utility. Such utility functions carry thus their 
names. See Neumann and Morgenstern (2004). 
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differentiation of the types of games in accordance with these elements is presented in Table 
1. 
Table 1: Possible equilibriums in game theory 
 
GAME 
STATIC DYNAMIC 
IN
F
O
R
M
A
T
IO
N
 
COMPLETE NASH EQUILIBRIUM 
PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM IN 
SUBGAMES 
INCOMPLETE 
NASH-BAYESIAN 
EQUILIBRIUM 
PERFECT BAYESIAN 
EQUILIBRIUM 
Source: Produced by the authors from Mas-Collel, Whinston and Green (1995) and Bierman and Fernandez 
(1998). 
In this article, the mobile phone devices industry is analyzed in an already occurred 
period of the 2000s (ex post), considering that the firms act simultaneously – thus, 
corresponding to a static analysis. In addition, it is considered that the firms engaged in this 
industry do not have full information on the other. Thus, below are detailed briefly the Nash-
Bayesian game type, that will be used in subsequent model. 
Nash-bayesian equilibrium: harsanyi’s contribution 
The Nash-Bayesian equilibrium occurs in static games (where players move at the 
same time) and the participating players do not know all the relevant information about the 
other (including payoffs that will be received in the different rewards strategies of the game). 
It is said, therefore, that such games have incomplete information. 
The presence of incomplete information, as pointed out by Mas-Collel, Whinston and 
Greene (1195, p. 253), would generate the need to consider the beliefs of the players on the 
preferences of the others players. It would also be necessary to consider the beliefs of these 
other players on the player’s belief and, in turn, about the others’ preferences, and so on, in 
the spirit of rationalization. 
However, the above authors present that, fortunately, there is an approach to this 
problem that makes these considerations not needed. This approach refers to the works of 
Harsanyi (1968). In such, it is considered that the preferences of each player are determined 
by the realization of a random variable. Although only the player knows the realization of the 
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variable, de facto, his ex ante probability distribution is assumed to be of common knowledge 
to the players. 
Thus, the “Nature” would perform the first movement, choosing the realization of this 
random variable. This movement determines the type of preferences of the players, with each 
player observing only the fulfillment of their random variables. 
Once exposed the elements that structure a game in the Game Theory, is sought in the 
next section to analyze the elements of the theory of innovation that may point out the 
different strategies (of innovation) taken by the players (firms of the mobile phone devices 
industry) in the model considered later. 
The sources of innovation and de creative distruction 
The theory of innovation has as mark the studies of Schumpeter (1911). The author 
parts of the conception of capitalism as an evolutionary process, being by nature a system in 
constant economic change – not being, therefore, stationary. This economic system would 
have as a central element of its dynamic the change – which, in turn, would have in its base 
the competition of firms by innovations. 
In other to justify his exposure, Schumpeter (1911) parts of the presentation of the 
circular flow. In this system, innovations disrupt the precursor equilibrium framework in 
which the economy was, generating in turn the development of new productive forces. 
According to the author, the sources for the innovation process are: 
i. The introduction of a new product (radical innovation), or the improvement in the 
quality of existent products (incremental innovation); 
ii. The introduction of a new method of production, not yet previously tested in the 
manufacturing industry (it does not necessarily is based on a new scientific 
discovery, but it can occur through a new way of managing a product 
commercially); 
iii. The opening of a new market (with best marketing and sales strategies, for 
example); 
iv. The conquest of a new source of raw materials or of semi-manufactured products; 
v. The establishment of a new organization in an industry (such as the establishment 
of a monopoly position or the fragmentation of a previous monopoly position). 
83 
                                                                          
https://periodicosonline.uems.br/index.php/GEOF/index                                                                                          
 
 
© 2017 - Universidade Estadual de Mato Grosso do Sul. Todos os direitos reservados. ISSN: 2447-9195. 
Geofronter, Campo Grande, n. 3, v. 1, janeiro a junho de 2017, p. 71-95. 
 
These industrial change processes revolutionize the economic structure by destroying 
the old structure and creating a new one. This progression is presented by Schumpeter (1911) 
as the process of creative destruction. Freeman and Soete (2008, p. 25), following the line of 
Schumpeter in the studies of innovation, consider that the Research and Development (R&D) 
entities in the firms are the main bodies responsible for this process of social and economic 
change, as for the changes of the capitalist production in the twentieth century. The authors 
consider these R&D entities, together with the industrial production and the marketing as of 
crucial importance for the world economies. 
On the model considered here, it is analyzed the different strategies of innovation of 
the firms from the mobile phone devices industry. Thus, the sources of innovation presented 
by Schumpeter (1911) are grouped in two groups
11
: 
 
 
i. Innovations by products 
In which is considered the sources generated by the firms as a result of the process of 
Research and Development (R&D) of new products and new methods of productions 
(items i and ii). 
ii. Innovations through markets 
Considering the innovations generated because of sales and marketing of the firms 
(items iii and iv). 
This proposed division allows the analysis of innovation strategies of the firms by the 
creation of a proxy for each of the two groups. I.e., it is analyzed the innovations related with 
the expanses of R&D of the companies (innovation by products), as those related with selling, 
general and administrative (SG&A) expenditures (innovation through markets). 
Figure 5 shows the evolution expenditures on R&D and SG&A during the 2000s for 
the representative firms of the mobile phone devices industry analyzed (Apple, Nokia and 
Samsung). It is noticed that, after 2007, there is a fall in the index of R&D and SG&A 
expenditure for Nokia, with greater intensity especially after 2011. The reverse situation is 
verified for Apple and Samsung. I.e., the indexes has been raised during the period of 
                                                          
11
 The item v is not considered since its causality is exogenous to the firm. I.e., the changes in the industrial 
organization do not depend in the decisions of an individual firm alone. 
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analysis. However, for Apple, the index of R&D was superior that its SG&A index; and for 
Samsung the opposite case of Apple was verified.  
Figure 5: Expenditures on R&D and SG&A of the companies of the mobile phone devices 
industry in the 2000s – Index (1Q / 2007 = 100) 
 
Source: APPLE (2014), NOKIA (2014), SAMSUNG (2014). 
The Game theory applied to the mobile phone devices industry: a nash-bayesian 
equilibrium model of innovative strategy decisions 
Based on the goals presented, it was developed a model based on game theory to 
analyze the performance of the representative companies of the mobile phone devices 
industry throughout the 2000s regarding their innovative development. So, the model parts of 
the assumption that the performance of the companies differed over the period analyzed due 
to the different innovative strategies adopted by the representative companies. 
5.1 MODEL ASSUMPTIONS 
The model has the following characteristics: 
i. There are two players, the company 1 (Apple) and company 2 (Nokia in the 
application I; Samsung in the application II) 
ii. Each company has three possible actions: 
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a. Innovate by products (IP) – with higher spending on R&D vis-à-vis SG&A. In this 
case, the hypothesis is that the company focuses more on developing products 
with new technologies to attract consumers. 
b. Innovate through markets (IM) – with higher spending on SG&A vis-à-vis R&D. 
The hypothesis in this case is that the company focuses more on expanding the 
existent markets through expenditures in marketing and expanding its sales. 
c. Exit the market (E). 
iii. The company 1 (Apple) can enter in the market according to two types: 
a. Aggressively, with intensive investment in product innovation (and, therefore, 
higher expenditure on R&D). 
b. Non-aggressively, with investment in product innovation relatively less 
intensively. 
iv. Following the approach of Harsanyi (1968), the “Nature” makes the first move, 
determining the type of company 1. 
The equilibrium of the game is configured, thus, as a Nash-Bayesian equilibrium and 
its game tree may be represented as in Figure 6. 
Figure 6: Game tree of the model 
 
Source: Elaborated by the authors. 
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Thus, Nature performs the first movement determining the kind of innovative type of 
the company 1 – I.e., if it is aggressive or non-aggressive. Then, the company 2 takes its 
action in the game, i.e., innovates through markets, by products or exit the market. At the 
same time, the company 1 also conducts its action, i.e., innovates through markets, by 
products or exit the market. 
Mobile phone devices industry performance based on the model 
Based on the data presented in sections 1 and 4, it is possible to use the developed 
model in order to analyze the scenario in the mobile phone devices industry since 2007. As 
previously presented, from that year the production of the smartphone by Apple, and the other 
companies in the market insert themselves in the market soon after. Thus, with the ex post 
facto data, it is analyzed the behavior of the companies based on the model suggested. 
In the period analyzed, Apple inserts itself in the market with intense innovation, 
presenting higher expenditures in R&D vis-à-vis SG&A. In the model, a way to illustrate such 
facts is presenting Apple’s strategy to be Aggressive and Innovating by products (IP). 
Therefore, one may incorporate this information in the previous game, removing the strategies 
that are not expressed in the analyzed scenario, as shown in Figure 7. 
Figure 7: Model game tree based on Apple’s data 
 
Source: Elaborated by the authors. 
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Going forward, there are three possible terminal nodes: (Aggressive → IP); 
(Aggressive → IM → IP); and (Aggressive → E). The third terminal node can also be 
removed, since all companies analyzed remained in the market during the period analyzed. 
Next, it is tried to incorporate the ex post facto data for the other two companies of the 
model. In the case I, it is incorporated the strategy verified by Nokia’s data. In the case II, it is 
incorporated the strategy verified by Samsung’s data. 
5.2.1 Case I: Apple and Nokia 
For the period after 2007, the expenditure on R&D undertaken by Nokia always 
showed superior growth than those on SG&A. Thus, it is suggested that the strategy adopted 
by Nokia in the period was to innovate by products (IP). It is possible to present this 
information on the game tree as followed in Figure 8. 
Figure 8: Model game tree based on Apple and Nokia’s data 
 
Source: Elaborated by the authors. 
Thus, the equilibrium for the model is (Aggressive → IP → IP). The payoff on that 
terminal node can be displayed based on the average of the net profit of the companies for the 
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period from the first quarter of 2007 to the third quarter of 2014
12
. In the case of Apple, the 
average net income for the period was 526,2, while for Nokia was 39,9. 
5.2.2 Case II: Apple and Samsung 
As shown in section 4, in the case of Samsung, between 2007 and 2014, its 
expenditures on SG&A showed superior growth than those on R&D. It is, then, suggested that 
the strategy adopted by Samsung was to innovate through markets (IM). Thus, the game with 
this information can be shown in Figure 9. 
Figure 9: Model game tree based on Apple and Samsung’s data 
 
Source: Elaborated by the authors. 
Similar to the case of Nokia’s analysis, there is a single terminal node possible, with 
the game’s equilibrium being (Aggressive → IM → IP). The payoffs, measured in terms of 
average of the net profit for the companies between the first quarter of 2007 and the third 
quarter of 2014 show the value of 526,2 for Apple and 237,2 for Samsung. 
                                                          
12
 The values of the payoffs are presented in index (100 = 1Q/2007), since the currencies accounted on the 
earnings release of the companies differ. 
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Conclusion 
The objective of this study was to demonstrate the influence of different types of 
innovation in the performance of companies in the mobile phone devices industry through a 
model based on the game theory. In section 5 was presented a theoretical model with a Nash-
Bayesian equilibrium and was analyzed the final equilibrium resulting from that model and 
from the data of the companies for the first quarter of 2007 to the third quarter of 2014. 
In can be observed that, starting from Apple innovating by products intensively 
(through a higher growth in expenditure on Research and Development (R&D) than on 
Selling, General and Administrative (SG&A)), the competitor’s strategy to also innovate by 
products had a worse outcome than that of innovate through markets (with a higher 
expenditure in SG&A than on R&D). 
This is illustrated through a static-comparative analysis of the two cases shown. In the 
first case, Nokia competes in the market through innovation by products; in the second one, 
Samsung competes with innovation through markets. With the assistance of the data of 
section 4, it can be seen that, while in the case I the average net profit for the period was 39,9, 
in the case II the average was 237,2. 
Therefore, assuming the central importance of the innovative character of the 
companies to persist in an oligopolistic market, the model helps to understand the context of 
the mobile phone devices industry in the 2000s. I.e., the model contributes to verify the 
reasons that led to the decline of the total earnings and the net profits of Nokia, while 
Samsung and Apple presented an opposite scenario. The model also helps in understanding 
the restructuration verified at the end of the 2000s for the industry, with the merging of 
companies from outside of the market with those of worst performance in the market – Nokia, 
Motorola – relatively to those that had better performance – Apple, Samsung. In can by 
concluded, thus, that companies operating in an oligopoly market should have a special 
concern to their innovative strategies to remain operative in dynamic markets, as specifically 
verified for the mobile phone devices industry. 
Finally, it is noteworthy that such models have inherent limitations, given the 
complexity of the reality of the markets. However, the model raises the possibility of new 
studies taking as a base the advances from the analysis of the present study. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A.1: Data from the companies of the mobile phone devices industry from 1Q/2000 
to 1Q/2015. 
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Table A.1: Data from the companies of the mobile phone devices industry from 1Q/2000 
to 1Q/2015. 
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1 
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18.1
39 
5.10
5 
2.14
2 
1.08
9 
3.212 
20
08-
3 
7.4
64 
2.6
00 
1.0
72 
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Source: APPLE (2014), NOKIA (2014), SAMSUNG (2014). 
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